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Summary. -- To achieve humanitarian objectives, international
development assistance must be structured to insure its
effectiveness.  The resulting conditionality, however, raises
sovereignty concerns as attempts to promote effectiveness may
conflict with respect for recipient state sovereignty and
indirectly violate individuals' right to self-determination.  The
paper explores the nature of this conflict and provides
guidelines for official donors.
Vassar College Economics Working Paper # 38
This paper examines implications of the moral or
humanitarian basis for international aid, focusing specifically
on a potential conflict with respect for recipient state
sovereignty.  Here, sovereignty refers to a moral right rather
than the principle underlying the post-Westphalian international
legal system.  The humanitarian motive is not the only basis for
giving aid but it cuts across all types of aid (bilateral,
multilateral, and private) and is an important component of long
term support for aid.  With its focus on sovereignty, the
critique presented is particularly relevant for multilateral aid
since this type of aid relies more heavily on humanitarian
justifications.
I. Introduction
In his book entitled Practical Ethics, Peter Singer argues
that we have an obligation to assist, to give foreign aid.1 
Accepting our obligation as aid donors carries with it positive
and negative duties:  that our aid do as much good as possible
and as little harm as possible.  To do so, we must structure aid
with conditions intended to promote the good aspects and reduce
the bad.  This raises the question of conditionality:  what
conditions, implicit or explicit, should aid donors place on
their assistance?  By placing conditions on aid, we may at times
not give aid.  It is clear in some extreme cases, e.g., Somalia
circa 1989, that there is an obligation not to give aid as it
2supports brutal regimes which otherwise would not remain in
power.  Likewise, there are many cases, especially in disaster
relief, where there is a clear obligation to give aid.  But what
can be said of the continuum in between, where is the dividing
line between the obligation to give and the obligation not to
give, and what sort of conditions on giving are justified in each
situation?
In this essay, I examine official international aid. 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) is from multilateral
agencies such as the World Bank and bilateral agencies such as
United States Agency for International Development (US AID) to
governments of less developed countries (LDCs).  As this sort of
aid potentially can influence the policies of LDC governments, 
it raises the question of infringement on state sovereignty.  In
contrast, private aid from charitable organizations is "from
people to people" and the manner of giving is not often based on
conditions.
The apparent conflict between official aid and state
sovereignty has increased in recent years.  During the Cold War
era, LDC governments were thought to have a fair degree of
leverage in aid negotiations as they could play the East against
the West.2  In addition, the conditions for aid were not often in
direct conflict with state sovereignty:  voting on UN resolutions
of little import to the country or granting rights for military
3bases which would also stimulate the local economy.3  This silver
lining of the Cold War began to fade, however, with the end of
Chinese foreign aid in 1979 and the rapid demise in Eastern Bloc
aid through the 1980s.  The debt crisis touched off by Mexico's
default in 1982 further narrowed options for LDC governments. 
Ensuing negotiations led to greater cartelization of the aid
donors and focused attention on LDC macroeconomic policies and
governance.  By the late 1980s, aid conditionality was in direct
conflict with state sovereignty.
This conflict between aid and sovereignty is not surprising. 
The positive and negative duties implied by giving aid require
placing conditions on aid and conditionality, unless it is
spurious, will conflict in some way with sovereignty.  Yet, state
sovereignty cannot simply be ignored, as sometimes seems to be
the practice.  If the government has any legitimacy in
representing the "will of the people," the right to self-
determination translates into the right to state sovereignty and
must be respected.  In addition, state sovereignty itself is an
important component of self-sustaining development, our ultimate
goal as aid providers.
The rest of this essay fills out these arguments.  I first
refine the obligation to give aid and the duties implied therein.
In the following section, I contrast the political and the
philosophical views of state sovereignty and, casting political
4sovereignty as a right, explore the implications of the latter. 
I next argue that the conflict between official aid and
sovereignty is central and unavoidable.  The final section
provides some guidance for making the necessary compromise
between conditionality and sovereignty and closes with a sketch
of the implications for aid in practice.
II. Duties of Aid Donors
The arguments I present here accept the claim that we have
an obligation to give aid to distant peoples.  Using this as a
starting point, the focus shifts from aid as a cost to the donor
to aid as a benefit to the recipient.  In this light, we can
reinterpret aid in a more abstract and meaningful fashion:  aid
is relief and development assistance.  The relevant quantity is
not the amount of aid given but the amount of relief and
development assistance received.  Relief prevents starvation and
health-threatening malnutrition.  Development assistance promotes
a self-sustaining increase in the quality of life particularly
for the poorest in society.4
With this conception of aid, we cannot look simply at
resource transfer.  Rather, we must look at the use of these
resources, at the long term effects of these uses and the
resource transfer itself, and at distributional issues.  Should
the World Bank or US AID have counted aid to the Philippines
5during the Marcos era as the number of billions of dollars
transferred to government accounts?  Surely not, when all
involved knew that much of the money quickly found its way into
private hands.5  The long term effects have been negative as
repayment of Marcos era loans from the World Bank continues to
this day.  This so-called aid has also worsened the distribution
of income as most of the benefits were gathered by the wealthiest
while current structural adjustment policies necessary to
continue debt servicing push the unskilled unemployment rate
toward 50 percent.  As this example points out, the obligation to
give aid must go beyond a blind transfer of resources.
As aid donors, we have certain duties.  These duties insure
that the aid given, the resource transfer, is received as
disaster relief and development assistance.  These duties are
positive and negative:  the positive duty to maximize the good
done and the negative duty to avoid significant harm to a
significant number of people.  If aid does not adhere to these
guidelines, it is meaningless to call it aid.6
The positive duty to insure that aid given is used
efficiently in relief and development work is a primary force
behind the practice of administering aid as development projects
rather than channeling aid funds directly into the general budget
of the recipient government.  A development project has
relatively specific goals and is defined sectorally,
6geographically or both.  It is implemented over a fairly short
period of time, typically three to eight years.  The donor knows
the use of its aid and can calculate in a rough way the
contribution made to economic development.  This, it is hoped,
will enable the donor to be sure its resources are used well. 
Indeed, the charters of some international development
organizations, including the World Bank and the Asian Development
Bank, require these institutions to insure that their funds are
used efficiently for promoting development.  Such clauses
traditionally have been interpreted as requiring project aid.
It is well known that the project level cost-benefit
analysis alluded to above can be misleading.  Donors face a
fungibility problem since aid funds for a project the government
already intended to carry-out effectively finance other
activities which may be in direct conflict with donor goals.7 
The positive duty of the aid donor is not easily met.  Not
only must the donor examine the merits of the project funded, it
must also speculate about the intentions of the recipient
government.  In the case where the donor is not generally in
agreement with the policies of the recipient government, the
donor must put relatively strict conditions on the use of aid,
even targeting projects not highly favored by the recipient
government, if it wishes to minimize the fungibility problem.
Matching this positive duty is a negative duty to avoid
7forms of aid which might be harmful.  This includes refraining
from funding projects with such fungibility issues, with adverse
environmental impact, or which harm some segment of society. 
Unfortunately, these are not merely theoretical issues; the
history of development aid is filled with examples of donors
ignoring this negative duty.  World Bank funding of the
Polonoroeste regional development program and the Greater Carajas
program in Brazil led to massive and, most likely, foreseeable
environmental destruction and human suffering of indigenous
peoples.  The Transmigration project from Java to the outer
islands of Indonesia, the Chico Dam project in the Philippines,
and the Narmada Dam project in India all included both
international aid and massive displacement of people without
reasonable compensation.  In most of these cases, one could argue
that international donors had a negative duty not to fund these
projects as they were fundamentally unsound.
Thus, the positive and negative duties of aid donors imply
strict conditions on development assistance.  Such conditionality
in the context of the unequal aid relationship raises concerns
over the sovereignty of the recipient state.
III. The Right to Political Sovereignty
Why should we respect the political sovereignty of aid
recipients when it may interfere with the efficient allocation of
8development assistance?  On what basis is political sovereignty
deemed a right?  Much of the writing in international relations
does not treat sovereignty as a right but as a logical principle
organizing the interaction of states and promoting order.  Yet,
for the purposes of the current argument it is the right to
sovereignty rather than the legal tradition which is central.
The concept of sovereignty has been evolving as long as the
modern nation-state.  Some scholars, notably Bodin in the 16th
century and Schmitt in the 20th, view the sovereign as a
political necessity and focus on characteristics of sovereign
power.  For Bodin, "sovereignty is the absolute and perpetual
power of a commonwealth."8  The sovereign should serve the
interests of the people and the state but is answerable only to
God.  According to Schmitt, "Sovereign is he who decides on the
exception."9  As such, sovereignty cannot be shared between
organs of government or limited in any way.  The central concern
for both men is national and international political stability;
only an absolute source of authority can deal with every
eventuality.  Indeed, since the absolute sovereign is above the
laws of men, the only justification is the role the sovereign
plays.  The right of a state to sovereignty is not discussed as
such by Bodin and Schmitt.
The current literature on the role of sovereignty in
international relations focuses largely on what limits should be
9imposed on sovereignty (and restrictions lifted on intervention)
to better protect human, economic, and political rights without
destabilizing the international system to the point of armed
conflict or allowing aggressive behavior under the guise of
humanitarian intervention.  In his Morgenthau Lecture, J. Bryan
Hehir emphasizes the "fragile moral foundation" of what has
become known as the Westphalian system:  "The ethical calculus
supporting the rule [of nonintervention] involves a clear
consequentialist choice to give priority to order over justice in
international relations."10  Sovereignty and its corollary of
non-intervention are viewed as the basis of a stable
international political system, privileging order over justice. 
Although an ethical position is articulated — in weighting the
good of order against the good of justice — sovereignty itself is
still not viewed as a right.  Respect for state sovereignty is
not based on a right to sovereignty but rather on the merits of
order, and in practice implies a rule of nonintervention.  The
next move in this more recent literature — outlining when
intervention is justified — considers the tradeoff between
justice and order, evidence again that a right to sovereignty is
not considered directly.  In contrast, scant attention is given
to economic and political coercion as they pose no immediate
threat to order.11
There is, however, a philosophical tradition which views
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state sovereignty as a right.  This right derives from the rights
of the individual citizens and the legitimacy of the state. 
Based on natural law or other arguments, most modern philosophers
place the individual's right to self-determination high on the
list of human rights.  Viewing the state as a collection of
individuals, the domestic analogy translates respect for self-
determination of the individual into respect for sovereignty of
the legitimate state.  A legitimate state is one considered
legitimate by a substantial majority of its citizens, i.e., a
government not maintained by continual threat of force against
its citizens, and that does not engage in criminal activities
such as the widespread violation of human rights, including
subsistence rights.  Although we may favor a particular form of
government, we must accord any legitimate state the right to
sovereignty over its territorial domain and domestic policies.12
What is entailed in respecting the right to sovereignty of a
legitimate state?  It is not only the territorial domain of the
sovereign state that should be held sacrosanct but also the
domestic policies (and foreign policies to the extent that they
do not come into conflict with those of another state).  Indeed,
the arguments presented above focus on this latter aspect of
sovereignty since the individual's right to self-determination is
most directly linked to the formulation of domestic policy.13 
Foreign powers (any organization not directed by and primarily
11
composed of citizens of the state) should not attempt to
influence unduly the process of domestic policy formation in a
legitimate sovereign state or assume the functions of government. 
However, not all forms of external influence are excluded.  The
foundational principle of international law is the equality of
sovereign states.  One state may attempt to influence the
policies of another but only using methods consistent with
equality, that is, excluding coercion.  In this context, the
meaning of coercion extends beyond the threat of physical force. 
Any action which directly or intentionally threatens the
integrity of the state or the welfare of its citizens is
prohibited.14
In a like manner, there are limits to delegation of
sovereign responsibilities.  Bodin makes clear that a sovereign
can delegate its duties and powers to others, enumerating who may
and may not be deemed sovereign, but true sovereignty remains
with the original sovereign.  A state may yield sovereign rights
through international treaties, trade agreements, and membership
in organizations (such as the UN) but must retain ultimate
sovereignty.  This is assured as long as the state enters these
agreements freely and delegates its powers by choice.  An
external power may not assume functions of the sovereign state by
means of coercion and still claim to respect that sovereignty.
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IV. The Conflict between Aid and Sovereignty
The duties of the aid donor appear to require aid
conditionality that conflicts directly with respect for recipient
state sovereignty.  But are sovereignty concerns relevant?  There
is no external compunction to accept aid from a donor.  The
recipient freely enters into the contract with whatever
conditions and restrictions contained therein.  The same agent --
the LDC government -- both makes this decision and safeguards
state sovereignty.  Even such extreme proponents of an absolute
and undivided sovereign as Bodin and Schmitt would argue that
sovereignty is undiminished by entering into agreements with
other states or temporarily vesting control in another body. 
Where is the coercion?
Yet this argument falls short.  A government may face
conflicting duties -- the duty to improve the welfare of its
citizens and the duty to preserve state sovereignty.  Given
prevailing conditions, most LDC governments accept aid to satisfy
the needs rather than the wants of their citizens.  From this
point of view, it is clear that the recipient government is not
"free" to reject aid.  It is obligated to accept aid that may
infringe on sovereignty in order to meet the needs, not the
wants, of its citizens.  Thus, conditionality is in a sense
coercive.  If it impinges on sovereignty, conditionality is
unjust in that it forces the government to choose between
13
conflicting duties.
The question of what constitutes coercion or intervention
has been examined extensively by international law scholars. 
Thomas and Thomas impose a strict interpretation though one which
hinges on the motives of the intervening states:
... if the activity is undertaken as a measure of
economic compulsion or pressure in order to dictate the
policy of another state, there is an invasion of the
protected sphere of interest of that state and it
become intervention.15
Knorr identifies both negative and positive sanctions as
potentially coercive.  Negative sanctions, the threat to cut off
foreign aid, are "an attempt at coercion ... only when both
parties understand that the former recipient [of aid] must do
something specific in order to effect a resumption of aid." 
Likewise,
... there [is] also an attempt at coercion when a new
aid offer is used as a positive sanction, that is, when
the prospective recipient is told that he will get aid
provided if he satisfies certain stipulated
conditions.16
In reviewing this literature, Brown points out that the element
14
of coercion ultimately derives from the situation of the aid
recipient:
One could argue that such promises of aid are not truly
coercive since the target state is not strictly
speaking compelled to accept the conditions of the aid. 
Nonetheless, the need of that state for aid may be
compelling.17
If aid with conditions violates sovereignty, should we
reconsider our earlier position and reexamine the merits of
unconditional aid?  Baldwin argues strongly against this,
delineating what unconditional (stringless) aid implies:
The concept of aid without strings implies both that
aid would be distributed randomly and that aid would
continue to be allocated regardless of the behavior of
the recipient states.  This is useful since the sooner
the preposterous requirements of stringless aid are
understood, the sooner one can get on with examining
the important problems of the number and kind of
strings on aid that are desirable from various points
of view.18
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V. Resolving the Conflicts
Recognizing the nature and importance of this conflict
between aid and sovereignty can take us a long way toward
resolving it.  In the following discussion, I outline such a
resolution making frequent use of the domestic analogy.  By the
domestic analogy I mean that I assume interpersonal ethics can be
extended to the international arena but allow for modification
when that analogy falls short.19  I argue that project aid can be
made explicitly conditional on how the resources are used and
distributed.  I also argue for implicit conditionality on program
aid but claim that explicit policy conditions pose too great a
threat to sovereignty.
As a domestic analogy, consider encountering a needy woman
with children living on the street.  We have an obligation to
assist this woman if the cost to us of doing so is not too high. 
We may give money.  We may offer food, clothing or shelter.  We
may provide coupons redeemable only for basic necessities.  We
may offer job training.  None of these forms of assistance
violate the homeless woman's right to sovereignty or self-
determination.20  Likewise, providing international assistance in
the form of food or clothing or health care training or
construction of an irrigation system does not violate the
sovereignty of the recipient state.  If, in the unself-interested
judgement of the donor, this form of aid is most appropriate from
16
an efficiency point of view, then we have satisfied
simultaneously our two criteria, respecting state sovereignty and
providing effective aid (assuming fungibility issues have been
considered as well).  If the aid can be conceptualized as a
"thing" or a service to the recipient, offered with no external
conditions, it fits this general category.  Conditions implied by
this type of aid are intrinsic to the goods or services offered.
Continuing with the analogy, suppose we encounter the same
woman one year later with yet another child and still on the
street.  Bracketing concerns about the children’s welfare, we may
think twice about repeating our generous act.  Our assistance has
had little impact on the woman and we can guess that repeating it
is unlikely to lead to permanent improvements.  We would be
within our rights to withhold assistance to her this time,
perhaps directing our aid to another equally needy person.  Yet,
a clear part of the problem is the woman's inability to limit her
fertility.  Perhaps the most efficient thing would be to convince
her to address this issue.  We might offer free lodging on the
condition that she get a NorPlant™ or a tubal ligation.  On
further investigation, we find that the young woman dropped out
of school at an early age.  We could offer food and clothing on
the condition that she go back to school.  Although this sort of
aid may be well intentioned, it is clearly coercive, infringing
on the woman's bodily integrity and freedom of choice.  This sort
17
of explicit conditionality, while possibly very effective, is by
most standards an unacceptable violation of self-determination
since the needy person cannot reject the offer.
For the purposes this paper, I focus strictly on the woman. 
The children play a purely instrumental role, illustrating a
situation where choices made by the woman may make her worse-off
and yet are so fundamental to her right to self-determination
that those choices should not be forcefully restricted.  The
analogy compares the woman’s decisions with choices made by a
legitimate government and restrictions on the woman with
restrictions on government action.21
I draw a number of lessons from this domestic analogy. 
First, the aid donor is well within its rights to employ implicit
conditionality, that is to assist only those countries which meet
some criteria which the donor believes important for aid
effectiveness.  Although apparently harsh, this applies equally
to development assistance and relief aid.  If very little of the
relief aid reaches those in need, the donor is free to redirect
its resources.
Second, explicit conditions which link aid to significant
aspects of LDC government policy or organization are unacceptable
violations of state sovereignty.  The effectiveness of such
measures is not at issue; if the government is legitimate, such
coercive conditions do to the collective what the overzealous
18
philanthropist did to the homeless woman -- violate the right of
self-determination.  Such conditions are extrinsic
characteristics which violate sovereignty since they lie in the
sphere of public policy.  This applies equally to extrinsic
conditions placed on project and program aid.  As an example of
project aid, funding for an agricultural project should not be
explicitly conditional on macroeconomic policy.  In the case of
program aid, there are no intrinsic characteristics and hence the
focus is on conditionality.
Such a sharp distinction between the ethical merits of
implicit and explicit conditionality is sensible only if there is
a real, practical difference between the two.  Is there?  With
explicit conditionality, the aid contract explicitly links
satisfaction of certain conditions by the recipient with
disbursement of funds.  For example, funds might disburse only
after rice subsidies are eliminated, following a currency
devaluation, or after the government payroll is cut by one third. 
Implicit conditionality entails an official or unofficial
practice linking policies of potential aid recipients to aid
eligibility.  A donor might choose to aid only countries which do
not subsidize basic commodities, have a market determined foreign
exchange rate, or avoided wasteful spending on bloated
bureaucracies.  On first consideration, the only difference is
timing.  In the first case, donor and recipient enter into a
19
contract before the recipient's actions are observed by the donor
while in the second case, interaction only occurs after the donor
has observed these actions.  In a repeated setting, we might
expect countries in need of aid to figure out what the donor
looks for and to craft their policies accordingly.  However,
explicit conditionality allows much more precise conditions on
aid and usually includes substantial "policy dialogue."  This
provides the donor with additional opportunities to influence
recipient behavior and greatly increases donor leverage over
recipient policies.
World Bank structural adjustment programs provide a clear
illustration of explicit policy conditionality at work.  Some
programs have had more than 100 conditions enumerated; in theory,
at least, the various tranches of the loan do not disburse until
the government has complied with the whole list.  Recently in
Kenya, the World Bank has begun requiring Policy Framework Papers
(PFPs) which spell-out prescribed government policy in great
detail.  While a government might anticipate that the World Bank
would be more favorably disposed to lending to a free trade
oriented country with limited government intervention, the level
of control could never be as complete as with direct donor
involvement.  Evidently, explicit policy conditionality infringes
on state sovereignty to a much greater degree than implicit
conditionality.
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In contrast, when dealing with an illegitimate government
explicit conditionality is allowable, perhaps even advisable.  If
the government maintains itself by force, it has no right to
sovereignty as its policies cannot be viewed as reflecting the
will of the citizens.  In theory, any reasonable conditions might
be placed on aid in such situations though conditions on human
rights and political reform are most likely given that these will
be pressing issues of national development.  Indeed, since
international assistance confers some semblance of legitimacy and
substantial resources on the recipient government, one could
argue that aid should focus on relief, human rights and political
reform in such cases.  Regardless, in these cases unconditional
aid is unlikely to accomplish its objective of promoting
sustainable development.
The stark domestic analogy employed above may cause one to
question whether this analogy is appropriate.  While forced
family planning is certainly not justified, perhaps some less
egregious infringement on self-determination could be found (such
as conditioning assistance on attending family planning
workshops).  Yet policy conditions advocated by donor agencies
have had dramatic implications for the poor in LDCs including
rapid increases in unemployment, reduction in public services
such as health care (resulting in rising maternal and child
mortality), and complete reversals in public policy.  Following a
21
scathing report by UNICEF, adjustment programs have included
consideration of social aspects yet this remains ancillary to the
central package.22
Granting that the analogy is indeed appropriate, we may
still favor a system which allows degrees of infringement on
sovereignty in proportion to the scale of the problem to be
addressed.  This perspective would follow naturally, for example,
from the principle of proportionality in the Just War tradition. 
In a real sense, however, proportionality is built into the
scheme outlined above.  If the recipient government has the full
faith of the donor, no conditions need be applied and aid may
take the form of a lump sum transfer of resources.  If the
government is sufficiently representative of the interests of its
citizens but does not share the same developmental agenda as the
donor, the latter will employ implicit conditionality to fulfill
its duties, limiting the use of aid by funding specific projects
or limiting the quantity of aid.  However, if the donor judges
the policies of the recipient government at odds with the best
interests of its citizens, the donor may withhold funding.  If it
judges the recipient government illegitimate as a representative
of the interests of its citizens, the donor may then employ
explicit conditionality to circumvent the illegitimate
government.  Thus, the donor's use of conditionality is in
proportion to its assessment of the merits of the recipient
22
government.
What implications can we draw for the "real world" practice
of development assistance?  As noted earlier, concerns over state
sovereignty have traditionally taken a distant second place to
efficiency and other issues.  The current practice of program aid
with explicit policy conditions (e.g., structural adjustment) and
project aid with external conditions clearly violate state
sovereignty.  With this type of aid recently accounting for as
much as 50 percent of new commitments of some development
agencies, would respect for sovereignty require a massive
restructuring of aid programs?23
Respect for sovereignty would mean the end of structural
adjustment programs as they are now developed and administered. 
World Bank structural adjustment programs have often been
"forced" on relatively reluctant recipients with points of
leverage including the large sums of money loaned as part of the
adjustment package, other project lending within the country, IMF
agreements, aid from other sources, and commercial lending. 
Accounts of the negotiation process between aid recipients and
donors over adjustment packages reveal a rather one sided
ultimatum approach.24  Adjustment has often been viewed as a
bitter pill required to satisfy aid donors with the corollary
that policy reversals have been frequent.  For example, in Zaire
civil unrest resulting from adjustment policies brought about an
23
end to the World Bank-sponsored program.
But research at the World Bank and elsewhere suggests that
restricting structural adjustment programs to borrower initiated
programs would not prove that "costly" and may even be
beneficial.  Echoing John Stuart Mill's argument that permanent
change must come from within a country, the degree of "borrower
ownership" (the level of recipient commitment to the policies)
has proven very important to the success of structural adjustment
programs.25  Thus, the majority of successful SAPs could be
implemented within a system in which LDC governments approach
donors with plans and request balance of payments assistance
during a crucial period of restructuring.  In many ways, respect
for state sovereignty is likely to restructure how "business gets
done" more than what is accomplished.26
In addition, following Mill’s "change from within" argument
and the concern for government institution building prevalent in
the development literature, respect for recipient state
sovereignty may accomplish much on its own.  Rather than seeing
their government (and themselves) dictated terms by the major
donors, citizens of LDCs would see their governments respected as
equals in international relations, thereby strengthening the
state and the idea of a cohesive nation.  As with all things,
self-government takes practice.  Good governance cannot be
dictated.
24
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